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ABSTRACT
The major (speculative) thesis of this essay is that, while in Europe, the idealist concepts 
have always co-existed with various concepts of (and trends toward) “practicality,“ in the 
United States of America the pragmatist view has by far been prevailing, reflecting also upon 
the history of bioethics. In the light of this proposal, the (mis)perception of Van Rensselaer 
Potter’s ideas is interpreted, as well as the roots of the current dichotomy between the 
mainstream bioethics, generated at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics in Georgetown, and 
the “Europeanised” direction of bioethics, primarily but not exclusively influenced by the 
discovery of Fritz Jahr’s work and the emergence of the integrative bioethics in South-Eastern 
Europe in the last fifteen years.
Those working in science know very well the “eternal curse” of ballancing between 
theory and “practical application.“ The modern rising pressure of funding priorities, 
the constant forced deviation of science toward marketing activities, the prefering of 
“evidence-based” clichéised products over ideas, on the one hand, and the beauty of 
pure self-satisfactory theory, glorified by Aristotle as the highest activity of man, on 
the other – all that has resulted in the emergence of a real internal dualist 
confrontation burdening our everyday activities.
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Sooner or later, one has to pose the question about the origin of this phenomenon. 
Since European culture certainly does include a very strong impetus of practicality, 
the notion has to be burried more deeply than one might expect recalling the recent 
cutting-budget experiences: indeed, it seems to originate from the very craddle of 
European thought – from the split of Socratic-Platonic idealist philosophy (where 
the notion is more perfect than the appearance) and the Aristotelian philosophical 
realism. Already critical toward the “intellectualism” and “staticality” of Socrates’ 
and Plato’s teachings, Aristotle not only advocated teleological interpretation that 
everything has to have its own purpose, but explicitly stated that “we arrive at moral 
virtue primarily through practice.“ As we know well, nevertheless, the unresolvable 
conflict and co-existence of the two approaches – the Platonic and the Aristotelian 
– have been present in European philosophy ever since, with a few occasional, major 
or minor “escalations” (like, for instance, in the medieval dispute between the 
nominalists and the realists, or between Hegel’s pure idealism and Fichte’s belief that 
“acting defines the value”). In the 19th and the 20th centuries, with the 
advancements of science and industry, a logical and expected invigoration occured 
of the positivist ideology of Auguste Comte, Rudolf Carnap, and others, but also 
with the very influential Marxist trust in the “man as a practical being.“ As an 
extreme of a longer Anglo-Saxon empirist tradition (of J. S. Mill, H. Spencer, etc.) 
and positivism, the pragmatist philosophy was pioneered by the logician, chemist, 
and mathematician Charles Sanders Peirce, the psychologist and physician William 
James, and the psychologist and educational reformer John Dewey – all three born 
Americans believing that “an ounce of experience is better than a ton of theory.” In 
Europe, we all know, many have criticised pragmatism, making of it only one 
among the concepts – Max Horkheimer (pointing that “practice” can be only 
aping), Ernst Bloch (re-establishing the cult of utopia), to mention only some of 
them. But in the US, pragmatism has remained the predominant view. Being fully 
conscious of the danger of such generalisation, one might say that the US were 
entered by the hungry, the expelled, and the ambitious, so it is no wonder that the 
US became the enterpreneurial filtrate of Europe: moreover, those who had 
emigrated to the US (and, more important, who stayed there!) mostly accepted the 
Darwinistic rhythm of competition and production (those who do not, remain 
eternal “Europeans in America”, which sounds and ends far less romantic than the 
“American in Paris”). Now, how is this related to the history of bioethics?
Among many other things, pragmatism might be blamed also for orienting bioethics 
toward legal protection of medical practioners (taking shape of the “informed 
consent”), toward deviding responsibility of making decisions (through “ethical 
committees”), and toward simplifying the process of making decisions (principlism 
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in the form of the “Georgetown Mantra”). All three directions have strictly been 
followed and fiercely promoted by the oldest and the most influential bioethical 
institution in the world – Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University in 
Washington, D. C. Without even touching the quarrel over the authorship of the 
word “bioethics,“ Van Rensselaer Potter’s warning about the dangers of modern 
technology could certainly have not been welcome by those glorifying the 
“progress”, except by the few Institute’s “Europeans in America” (by birth and/or by 
education) – Andre Hellegers, Warren Reich, and Hans-Martin Sass.
Burdened or blessed (depends on how one looks at) by the abundant tradition of 
disquisition between various variations of idealisms and pragmatisms, Europe 
adopted the doctrine of the “precautionary principle” (stating that “regulation is 
required whenever there is a possible risk to health, safety, or the environment, even 
if the supporting evidence is speculative,”1 as formulated in the 1980s), first by the 
“Communication on the precautionary principle,” issued by the European 
Commission in 2000, and later becoming even more strongly integrated into 
European laws, limited not only to environmental issues. A few American university 
professors have launched attacks against the “paralysing principle,“ as they have 
called it, claiming that “the problem with the Precautionary Principle is not that it 
leads in the wrong direction, but that – if taken for all it is worth – it leads in no 
direction at all.“2 However (and here we do not only take over Jeremy Rifkin’s 
attitude3 for granted), the European way seems more acceptable for one biological 
reason: one has to insert an estimation “pause” between “observing” (theoría) and 
“acting” (praxis), namely, unless one reacts reflexly. Acting based on pure vision vs. 
acting involving memory, morality, and other higher functions, reflects the 
difference between the so-called “dorsal and ventral streams” of elaborating 
informations within the brain cortex, the former being quicker and the latter being 
evolutionally younger and more complex.4
The Anglo-American pragmatist worldview has always prefered “practical ethics,“ 
addressing “everyday issues” and “ordinary people.“5 The way those “practical 
ethicians” have treated their chosen topics has mostly been limited to the 
methodology of analytical philosophy, that is, to provoking reactions by launching 
1 Cf. Wikipedia, “Precautionary principle,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precautionary_principle (accessed: 
April 4, 2015).
2 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, “The paralyzing principle,“ Regulation (Winter 2002-2003): 32-37.
3 Jeremy Rifkin, Europski san: kako europska vizija budućnosti polako zasjenjuje američki san, transl. by Andreja 
Kovačić and Damir Žugec (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006).
4 Cf. A. D. Milner and M. A. Goodale, The Visual Brain in Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
5 Cf. Peter Singer, Praktična etika, transl. by Tomislav Bracanović (Zagreb: KruZak, 2003), VII.
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radical views, and to eristically discussing the topics following patterns of 
(mathematical) logics.6 As we know, Singer’s provocative views resulted in the 
banishing of his lectures from German universities. In our parts of the world, the 
circles and groups promoting pragmatism and Singerianism do not only translate 
and publish books on that matter, but also quite vehemently campaign agaist the 
non-analytical approach of the integrative bioethicists, “charging” them with 
“pseudoscientific features,“ “conceptual confusion,“ “inconsistency,“7 and, of course, 
with “squandering the tax-payers’ money.“ Those wars may be curious, but always 
quite unproductive.
The application of a theory is something one should not be afraid of or escaping 
from: actually, to paraphrase the Aristotelian formula, practice is a half way between 
theory and creation. What one should avoid, however, is the trap of subduing 
theory to the final aim: because that would be precisely what so many doctrines 
suggest not to do – to focus upon the END instead of the WAY thus making the 
intellectual challenge far less intriguing.
6 The globally leading names in this “field” certainly are the Australians Peter Singer and Julian Savulescu. In 
Rijeka, “practical ethics” has mostly been advocated and acted in that way by Nenad Miščević, Elvio Baccarini, 
Snježana Prijić-Samaržija, and others; in Zagreb by Tomislav Bracanović, Tomislav Janović, and others; and in 
Belgrade primarily by Vojin Rakić.
7 Tomislav Bracanović, “From integrative bioethics to pseudoscience,“ Developing World Bioethics 12, no. 3 
(2012): 148-156.
